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Abstract. Since generally legal regulations do not provide clear pa-
rameters to determine when their requirements are met, achieving legal
compliance is not trivial. The adoption of standards could help create
an argument of compliance in favour of the implementing party, pro-
vided there is a clear correspondence between the provisions of a specific
standard and the regulation’s requirements. However, identifying such
correspondences is a complex process which is complicated further by
the fact that the established correlations may be overridden in time e.g.,
because newer court decisions change the interpretation of certain legal
provisions. To help solve these problems, we present a framework that
supports legal experts in recognizing correlations between provisions in
a standard and requirements in a given law. The framework relies on
state-of-the-art Natural Language Semantics techniques to process the
linguistic terms of the two documents, and maintains a knowledge base
of the logic representations of the terms, together with their defeasible
correlations, both formal and substantive. An application of the frame-
work is shown by comparing a provision of the European General Data
Protection Regulation with the ISO/IEC 27018:2014 standard.
Keywords: Legal compliance; legal requirements; security standards;
General Data Protection Regulation.
1 Introduction
As it happens with the European Union (EU) harmonized standards used to
demonstrate that products, services, or processes comply with relevant EU leg-
islation [11], when a standard published by a standardization body is endorsed by
the law, then implementing the standard also gives a legal presumption of com-
pliance. However, harmonized standards are a fortunate but uncommon case.
More often, standards do not have such a direct effect on legal compliance. By
adopting a standard however, an organisation can demonstrate a proactive at-
titude and best efforts to be compliant according to the state of the art in that
specific domain. Standards can thus provide the organisation with an argument
of compliance.
Such an argument of compliance, would rely on proving a clear correspon-
dence between the provisions of a specific standard and the law’s requirements.But
identifying such correspondences is not easy. It is also a dynamic process where
the established correlations can be further overridden in time, for instance be-
cause newer court decisions change the interpretation of certain legal provisions.
In this paper, we propose a way to ease, and partly to automate, the process
of checking for such document-to-document correspondences. We discuss a soft-
ware framework that aids in determining the formal and substantive correlations
between the provisions in a standard and those in a law. The framework’s core is
a logic-based methodology to represent, in a machine-processable format, (a) the
relevant syntactic concepts in the provisions, and (b) the relevant correlations
between them. In this paper, we describe this logic-based methodology and ex-
emplify how it works using provisions from two specific and relevant documents.
One is the standard ISO/IEC 27018:2014 (ISO 27018, in short), which concerns
public clouds acting as personal data processors. This standard and can be re-
garded as a building block [11] that helps data-processing organizations comply
with the principle of data protection accountability. The second document is the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is the new legislation on
data protection in the EU (see Section 2).
The framework depends on two auxiliary functional blocks (see Section 4):
(i) a logic knowledge base, which can be populated, corrected and extended by
legal experts and that stores the machine-processable logic correlations; (ii) a set
of Natural Language Semantics (NLS) and Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques, which allow a user to browse a XML representation of the documents
and to search and retrieve the words, the terms, and the sentences that have
been found relevant for correlation. The NLS and NLP techniques help users to
efficiently and precisely find the established correlations within the knowledge
base, which any expert user can successively reinforce, correct, justify, and ex-
pand. The selection of relevant terms and the definition of correlations, requiring
human reading, processing and decision-making, is therefore semi-automatic.
The correlations are expressed formally in a deontic and defeasible logic for
legal semantics called Reified Input/Output Logic (see Section 3). Defeasibility is
required since, due to differences in legal interpretation, some of the correlations
could be in contradiction: interpretations from more authoritative sources (such
as high courts) are thus required to eventually resolve the conflict.
2 The Data Protection Reform
The GDPR, which will apply from 25 May 2018, replaces the current Directive
95/46/EC3 with more modern rules, better adapted to the data processing re-
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data.
alities of today. Unlike Directive 95/46/EC, which required implementation by
the Member States, the GDPR will be directly applicable and does not require
transposition into national law.
The purposes of the GDPR [30] are to align data protection rules with the
most recent developments in data-processing technologies while still providing
a legislation that is flexible enough not to become outdated over the course of
a few years. The Regulation enhances the responsibility of data controllers and
strengthens the rights of the data subject. Controllers will face heavy adminis-
trative fines in case of non-compliance with its provisions [13], which go as high
as four percent of the total worldwide annual turnover of an undertaking4.
As many of the provisions of the GDPR are quite general and potentially
applicable in diverse ways, its interpretation through legal doctrine and jurispru-
dence will be of essence. The Regulation won’t be applicable before 25 May 2018
and therefore no decisions based on its provisions can exist until then. When it
will be applied, relevant decisions on its interpretations are expected to be is-
sued by the Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) of Member States, by national
courts, and by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
3 Related work
The application of NLP and NLS to the legal domain is a research trend that has
received a lot of attention and investments in recent years, as shown by several
acU-funded projects on the topic such as Openlaws5, ProLeMAS6, and MIREL7.
Modern NLP technologies [6] are able to classify and discover inter-links between
legal documents thanks to parsers [1], statistical algorithms [8], and legal termi-
nological databases or legal ontologies [40,8]. This is often done by transforming
the legal documents into XML standards, such as Akoma Ntoso8, where relevant
information are tagged. An example of commercial legal document management
system employing these technologies is Eurocases9, which collects EU case law
and uses NLP techniques to classify the documents on the basis of their topic [7].
Although these systems help navigate legislative documents and retrieve in-
formation, their overall usefulness is limited because they process words dis-
regarding their possible different semantic interpretations. The latter would
allow for legal reasoning, e.g., correlating laws among them and determining
whether they lead to inconsistencies. Semantic processing of documents like
laws/regulations and security standards is what we are going to propose as a
component of the methodology we present in Section 4.
The underlying logical framework we will use in our methodology is reified
Input/Output logic [36], a recent approach designed as an attempt to investi-
4 GDPR, Article 83.
5 https://info.openlaws.com/openlaws-eu/.
6 http://www.liviorobaldo.com/Prolemas.htm.
7 http://www.mirelproject.eu/.
8 http://www.akomantoso.org/.
9 http://eurocases.eu/.
gate the logical architecture of the provisions in natural language. Reified In-
put/Output logic merges Input/Output logic [24], a well-known formalism in
Deontic Logic (i.e., a logic that expresses concepts like permissions, obligations,
prohibitions), with the First Order Logic (FOL) for NLS proposed by [18], which
is grounded on the concept of reification.
3.1 Reification and Input/Output logic
Reification [10] is a concept that allows to move from standard notation in FOL
such as “(give a b c)”, asserting that “a” gives “b” to “c”, to another notation in
FOL “(give′ e a b c)”, where “e” is the reification of the giving action. “e” is a
FOL term denoting the giving event of “b” by “a” to “c”. Reification is able to
express a wide range of phenomena in NLS via simple flat FOL formulæ, which
are basically conjunctions of atomic first-order predicates.
It has been argued [19,31,32] that flat logical formulæ for NLS have a twofold
advantage. First, they allow to properly represent the semantics of several lin-
guistic constructions which are hard to represent in other popular formalisms
for NLS, such as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) [23] or Minimal Re-
cursion Semantics (MRS) [9]. Those formalisms introduce complex operators,
e.g., modal or causal operators, which take subformulæ as an argument. Nesting
sub-formulæ within other (sub-)formulæ prevents several readings indeed avail-
able in NLS, such as cumulative readings (see [33]) or causality and concession
(see [17,35]).
Secondly, flat formulæ enhance human readability and comprehension as well
as the ease of controlling computational complexity. These two features are of
course pivotal in the construction and debugging of large knowledge bases of
formulæ, to be used in practical applications, as advocated in our methodology.
Let us consider a simple example: the representation of the sentence “Jack
wants to eat an ice cream”. In standard NLS formalisms, e.g., DRT and MRS,
this sentence is formalized by introducing a modal operator for representing the
verb “want”, e.g., “want( . . . , . . . )”, which applies to a sub-formula representing
the sentence “Exists an ice cream that Jack eats”. For instance:
want(Jack,∃ic(eat(Jack, ic) )
In Hobbs’s, the eating hypothetical action is reified into an eventuality that
is inserted as argument of a FOL predicate want′:
∃e∃e1∃ic[ (Rexist e) ∧ (want′ e Jack e1) ∧ (eat′ e1 Jack ic) ]
Rexist is a special predicate used to assert which eventualities really exist in the
context; in the example above, the wanting event really exists while the eating
event does not. In the formulæ below, we will omit the Rexist predicates for
space constraints; we will deem easy to understand, in those formulæ, which
eventualities really exist and which do not.
On the other hand, Input/Output logic [24] is a well-known formalism in
deontic logic, grounded on norm-based semantics. Norm-based semantics has
been proposed as an alternative to deontic frameworks based on possible-world
semantics, such as STIT logic [20] and dynamic deontic logic [27]. It has been
argued that norm-based semantics provides: (1) a more flexible handling of the
well-known Jørgensen’s dilemma [22], stating that, contrary to declarative state-
ments, norms do not corresponds to truth values, i.e., they cannot be described
as true or false; (2) a straightforward and simple way to deal with moral conflicts
and different kinds of permissions (see [29,25] to see how to deal with these in
input/output logic); (3) a simpler and easy-to-control complexity; it has been
argued [39] that compliance checking in Input/Output logic are coNP/NP hard
and in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, while STIT and dynamic
deontic logic are respectively undecidable and EXPTIME-complete.
Input/output logic is not the only deontic framework that is not based on
possible-world semantics; alternatives are imperative logic [16], prioritized de-
fault logic [21] and defeasible deontic logic [14]. A fine-grained comparison be-
tween the mentioned formalisms on the basis of norm-based semantics goes
beyond the scope of this paper, in that it mostly lies on a theoretical level.
Therefore, we address the interested reader to the relevant literature.
Input/output normative systems are triples N = (O,P,C) of three sets of
pairs: obligations (O), permissions (P ), and constituency rules (C). A pair (a, b)
corresponds to an if-then rule. The expression (a, b) ∈ O reads “if a holds, then
b is obligatory”; (a, b) ∈ P reads “if a holds, then b is permitted”; and (a, b) ∈ C
corresponds to the standard FOL implication “a → b”. For space constraints,
below we will not consider permissions (see [25]).
So far, Input/Output logic has been mostly studied from a theoretical point
of view, with the elements a and b of the pairs being formulæ in propositional
logic. Reified Input/Output logic is the first attempt to make Input/Output
logic usable in practical applications in legal informatics, and to be used for
representing norms from existing legislation available in natural language only.
3.2 Reified Input/Output logic
As said above, reified Input/Output logic combines the advantages of the reified
and of the Input/Output logic, first of all their respective formal simplicity. As
argued in [36], simplicity appears to be a necessary feature for a logical for-
malism designed for application in legal informatics, in order to foster active
collaboration of legal practitioners, usually having little expertise in logic, who
can contribute to the building of large knowledge bases of formulæ. The method-
ology illustrated here represent the first attempt to build such a knowledge base,
with respect to the data protection domain.
In reified Input/Output logic, a and b are formulæ as defined in [18]. Thus a
sentence like “every bird who wants to eat is obliged to tweet” is represented as:
∀x(∃e∃e1 [ (bird x) ∧ (want′ e x e1) ∧ (eat′ e1 x) ], ∃e2 [ (tweet′ e2 x) ] ) ∈ O
Obligations are intended to populate the ABox of the knowledge base, i.e.,
the set of assertive contextual statements. On the other hand, the set of def-
initions, axioms, and constraints on the predicates used in the ABox are part
of the TBox of the knowledge base, i.e., the set of terminological declarative
statements, also known as constitutive rules.
As said above, constitutive rules are expressed as standard FOL implications.
For the sake of readability, below we will assert them as such (i.e., in the form
“a → b”), rather than as pairs in the form (a, b). For instance, the TBox could
contain a FOL implication specifying that all birds fly:
∀x( (bird x) → ∃e[ (fly′ e x) ] ) ∈ C
Finally, following [18], in reified Input/Output logic the implications popu-
lating the TBox can be made defeasible via a mechanism drawn from Circum-
scriptive Logic [26]. The antecedent of the implications can include an extra
predicate that can be assumed or not. For instance, the previous implication
can be made defeasible by adding a predicate “assumption1”:
∀x( ( (bird x) ∧ (assumption1 x) ) → ∃e[ (fly′ e x) ] ) ∈ C
This formula reads as: “if x is a bird and it can be assumed that x is a
‘normal’ bird, then x flies”. Not for all birds the assumption can be made. For
instance, penguins are a special type of birds that do not fly. This is codified as:
∀x( (penguin x) → ( (bird x) ∧ ¬(assumption1 x) ) ) ∈ C
If x is penguin, we derive that x is a bird but we cannot derive that x flies.
In our knowledge base, assumptions are used to model legal interpretations.
Handling legal interpretations via defeasible mechanisms is a common practice
in logical frameworks for legal informatics, such as [15]. A separate part of our
knowledge base will specify which legal authorities adopt a certain assumption,
which ones do not, and which ones either adopt it or not under certain conditions.
By selecting certain legal interpretations, it is then possible to derive different
conclusions from the knowledge base.
4 Methodology
The framework we propose offers a computer-aided methodology to analyze stan-
dards to make an argument of compliance with respect to a specific piece of legal
text, and is schematically summarized in Figure 1. Users (who may be lawyers,
regulators, auditors, or other legal experts) access a digital and annotated XML
representation of the normative texts (laws and standards). While browsing a
document and selecting the relevant concepts, NLP and NLS tools help traverse
the rest of the documents, find related terms, and recall previous correlations
between them. Correlations from different sources have different degrees of im-
portance, which need to be tracked using specific metadata. The framework im-
plements a collaborative strategy to evaluate the stored correlations. The user’s
decisions are stored in the knowledge base, after being appropriately represented
in a logic for legal semantics.
Fig. 1. The framework at a glance.
The framework, and in particular its knowledge base, does not pretend to
be complete. It rather provides expert users with an updated knowledge that
helps take autonomous and informed decisions, both when confirming the cor-
relations the tool suggests and when choosing to define new correlations. The
knowledge base is designed to support defeasible reasoning, i.e., to tolerate (ap-
parent) inconsistencies of different interpretations of terms, by overriding general
assertions into more contextually-specific ones. Conflicts are especially frequent
in legal interpretation, but they can generally be solved considering that the
interpretation by higher-instance courts, such as the CJEU, prevails over lower
ones. In order to cope with interpretations of different legal weights, which may
supersede one another, the logic formalism that the framework embeds is defeasi-
ble: correlations can be updated, modified, rewritten and weighed. If conflicts do
remain, the framework still embeds strategies that help the user take a decision.
As pointed out in Section 1, correlations can be further divided into two
different categories: formal and substantive correlations.
Formal correlations entail a mere textual overlap between concepts. For ex-
ample, formal correlations would allow us to observe that both the GDPR and
the ISO 27018 standard use the term “notify” (see Section 5). Substantive corre-
lations are more complex and entail the analysis of the actual meaning of terms.
To assert a correlation of this kind, requirements must be met in a concrete way.
Following the previous example, to assert a correlation between a provision of
the GDPR and one of the standard concerning notification, it is necessary to
verify the exact meaning of the term “notify” in the two texts.
The methodology follows three steps to build the correlations, involving both
a legal and a technical approach. The legal approach is focused on the interpre-
tation of the provisions of laws (the GDPR in our example) and standards (ISO
27018), whereas the technical approach consists of modelling those provisions
into an ontology, and expressing the interpretation by means of logical formulæ.
Step 1: analysis of the provisions. The provisions of the law and of the security
standard are analyzed by legal experts, who provide an interpretation of the
terms used in the provisions and compare them in search of semantic correlations.
There is no need for this interpretation to be final, as more interpretations can
be added later, and old interpretations can be overridden by newer ones, but
this start requires a significant manual activity.
This step entails two sub-steps. First, the legal documents need to be ex-
pressed in a machine-processable format. For the scope of this work, we have
selected the Akoma Ntoso language10. This is an XML-based format that allows
to easily navigate the documents and identify the relevant provisions in the legal
text. The legal interpretations of the documents, on the other hand, are stored in
separate documents, and contain a reference to their source, and another refer-
ence to the provision, or set of provisions, to which they apply. The use of unique
namespaces and identifiers in Akoma Ntoso allows for a fine-grained model of a
legal text and its interpretations.
To support the execution of this step, legal experts are assisted by exter-
nal NLP procedures that suggest (semi-automatically and during the browsing
of the documents) previous translations and correlations on the basis of the
information currently stored in the knowledge base. Ultimately, it is the legal
expert who must decide whether and how correlations need to be overridden. In
that case, new correlations are added and annotated with the source which con-
tributed to define it (e.g., Court of Justice of the European Union, Dapreco and
Copreda Corp., C-XYZ/16). Implications by more authoritative sources override
defeasible implications by less authoritative ones.
The interaction between the legal expert and the knowledge base will have
to take into account that the former are not expected to have deep technical
knowledge. This will be easily managed by means of appropriate front-ends and
user interfaces that can be serve the purpose of viewing and modifying exist-
ing interpretations and their connections with specific provisions, and that of
adding new interpretations, specifying metadata such as their nature, source,
and validity in space and time.
Step 2: creation of legal ontologies. The legal interpretations are mapped onto
legal ontologies of the law and the security standard. Legal ontologies [5] model
the legal concepts, parties and stakeholders affected by the law, the duties and
rights of each stakeholder, and the sanctions for violating the duties. As per
ontologies in general, legal ontologies are expressed in a knowledge representation
language. For this work, we chose the popular abstract language OWL, which can
be serialized using various XML notations. For example, the OWL representation
of the data protection ontology will contain concepts such as “controller”, “data
subject”, “personal data”, “processing” and so on.
The ontologies operates as the semantic base for the formal representation
of the legal documents and their interpretation expressed in the form of logic
formulæ. In other words, the ontologies represent the pivot of the methodology,
as both normative documents and the objects of the logic (predicates and terms)
are connected to the concepts expressed in the ontologies. In our final knowledge
base, the connection will be implemented via LegalRuleML OASIS standard11,
along the same lines illustrated in [12].
10 http://www.akomantoso.org/.
11 https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/legalruleml
The use of the OWL language guarantees that every concept in the ontologies
is uniquely identified, thus creating an unambiguous connection between a logic
formula, on the one side, and the concept or concepts to which it relates, on the
other. Using this connection, it will be easy to perform searches based not solely
on textual content, but also on semantic concepts and the relations between
them. Consequently, a search for legal interpretations can overcome linguistic
barriers such as typos or synonyms, and even be language-independent.
Work has started towards the creation of an improved ontology. In the in-
terim, a preliminary version of a legal ontology for the GDPR has been defined
already [4]. Albeit partial and based on an older version of the GDPR, it was
designed to express the duties of the controller. As such, it can be used to find
the correspondences between the requirements expressed in the GDPR and in
security standards.
Step 3: generation of logic formulæ. The third and final step of the methodology
consists of generating the logical formulæ representing the set of provisions in the
law and the set of provisions in the security standard, as well as the implications
between them. These formulæ are expressed in reified Input/Output logic [34].
An example is shown in the next section.
Associating textual provisions to logical formulæ amounts to converting am-
biguous and vague terms into non-ambiguous items (predicates and terms).
Words in the provisions are represented via predicates reflecting their vague-
ness. For example, the word “notify”, included in the sample provisions used in
Section 5, will be represented via the homonym predicate “notify”. These “vague”
predicates may be defined by adding implications and further constraints (ax-
ioms). Those implications will be defeasible, so that they can account for differ-
ent legal interpretations. Predicates are associated with classes of the ontologies
developed in Step 2 or with standard general-purpose ontologies/repositories
belonging to the NLS literature, e.g., Verbnet [38].
5 Generation of Logic Formulæ: example
We exemplify step 3 of our methodology. This step, which lies at the core of
the methodology, is the most technical, and more innovative than steps 1 and 2
which instead rely upon existing techniques. We use a provision from the GDPR
and an article of the ISO 27018 security standard:
(a) GDPR, Article 33.2: The processor shall notify the controller without undue
delay after becoming aware of a personal data breach.
(b) ISO 27018, Article A9.1: The public cloud PII processor should promptly
notify the relevant cloud service customer in the event of any unauthorized
access to PII.
The formulæ will include predicates reflecting the vagueness of the terms
occurring in the sentences. Thus, for instance, the verb “notify”, which occurs
in both provisions, is formalized into an homonymous predicate “notify”.
On the other hand, the provisions in the ISO 27018 use the term “PII”
(Personally Identifiable Information) while the ones in the GDPR use the term
“personal data”. Although one might simply consider the two terms as synonyms
(as suggested in ISO 27018, Article 0.1), and thus associate them with the same
predicate, our methodology keeps them distinct, i.e., it formalizes them via two
different predicates “personalData” and “PII”. An additional axiom is then added
to the TBox, in order to correlate the two predicates:
∀x[ (PII x) → (personalData x) ] (1)
The implication can be made defeasible by adding an assumption as shown in
Section 3. In that case, the normal rule is that PII is also considered personal
data, unless there is a special exception which overrides the general rule.
In light of this, the GDPR provision in (a) is formalized as follows:
∀eb∀x∀y(
∃ep∃ec∃ea∃z[ (dataProcessor x) ∧ (dataController y) ∧ (personalData z)∧
(process′ ep x z) ∧ (control′ ec y z) ∧ (awareOf′ ea x eb) ∧ (dataBreach eb z) ],
∃en [ (notify′ en x y eb) ∧ (nonDelayed end en) ] ) (2)
In (2), “ep”, “ec”, “ea”, ‘eb”, and “en” are variables referring to events. “ep” is
the event of processing the personal data “z” (patient) performed by the data
processor “x” (agent). “ec” is the event
12 of controlling the personal data “z”
(patient) performed by the data controller “y” (agent). If x become aware (“ea”)
of an event of data breach (“eb”) of the personal data “z”, then x is obliged to
notify it (“en”) to the data controller and that event must be done with undue
delay (predicate “nonDelayed”, applied to the eventuality “en”).
In (2), “notify” and “nonDelayed” are predicates whose meaning is subject
to different legal interpretations. Recalling the difference between formal and
substantive compliance outlined in Section 1, we note that the formalization in
(2) only enforces formal compliance. The formula in (2) simply requires the data
processor to notify data breaches without undue delay, but it does not specify
how notifications should be performed for being legitimate.
For instance, the data processor could require the data controller to acknowl-
edge the notification, in order to make sure it was received. Similarly, the proces-
sor could be required to avoid sending notifications of data breaches via standard
paper mail, in that the time needed by the postal service to deliver the mail could
be considered as an undue delay. It is up to judicial authorities to establish the
substantive compliance of the obligation in (2).
Of course, we do not have the authority to decide whether (2) is performed
in the proper way. In our work, we only aim at providing a methodology to keep
track of all legal interpretations of the provisions. From a formal point of view,
12 In this context, an event must not be considered as a specific occurrence happening
at a given time, but as a wider concept encompassing the whole of the controller’s
activity.
the TBox must be enriched with axioms defining the conditions under which
the predicates in the formula are true. Those axioms are defeasible, therefore
they will contain assumptions that may be taken or not. And, it is possible to
separately assert that certain assumptions are taken to be either true or false by
certain legal authorities, possibly under certain further conditions (see below).
For instance, by assuming that email with electronic signature is a proper
and prompt means to notify the data controller, the following (defeasible) axiom
is added to the TBOX.
∀x∀y∀e1∀e2 [ ( (sendEmailWithES e1 x y e2) ∧ (assumption2 e1) ) →
∃en( (notify′ en x y e2) ∧ (nonDelayed′ end en) ) (3)
Formula (4) models the ISO 27018 provision in (b):
∀e∀x∀y∀z∀ep∀ec∀eb( ( (PIIProcessor x) ∧ (PIIController y) ∧ (PII z)∧
(process′ ep x z) ∧ (control′ ec y z) ∧ (access′ ea z) ) ∧ (unauthorized ea) ),
∃en [ (notify′ en x y ea) ∧ (promptly′ enp en) ] ) (4)
As it was done for formalizing (a) into (2), the formula introduces predicates that
reflect the generic terms used in the text. With an important exception: we for-
malized “the relevant cloud service customer” via the predicate “PIIController”.
According to ISO 27018 the cloud service customer can be either a natural per-
son, “PII principal” or a “PII controller”, which processes the PII relating to
PII principals.13.
Therefore, building our example on the specific provision of the GDPR, the
cloud service provider (“PII Processor” - “data processor”) handling data of
natural persons (“PII Principals” - “data subjects”) will have to notify the or-
ganization on behalf of which it processes the data (“PII controller” - “data con-
troller”) of occurring incidents (“any unauthorized access to PII” - “ personal
data breach”) in a specific time frame (“without undue delay after becoming
aware” - “promptly”).
The final ingredient needed for (4) and (2) are axioms relating to the predi-
cates occurring in both, similar to the axiom in (1), which state that PII is by
default considered as personal data:
∀x[ (PIIProcessor x) → (dataProcessor x) ],
∀x[ (promptly′ x y) → (nonDelayed′ x y) ],
∀x[ (PIIController x) → (dataController x) ],
∀e∀z[ ( (access′ e z) ∧ (unauthorized e) ) → (dataBreach e z) ] (5)
The axioms in (5) are quite intuitive. For instance, the first one states that any
entity that is considered a PII processor according to ISO 27018 is also a data
processor with respect to the GDPR.
13 ISO 27018, Article 0.1: “The cloud service customer, who has the contractual re-
lationship with the public cloud PII processor, can range from a natural person, a
‘PII principal’, processing his or her own PII in the cloud, to an organization, a ‘PII
controller’, processing PII relating to many PII principals”.
It is easy to verify that every tuple of variables “e”, “x”, “y”, “z”, “ep”, “ec”,
and “ea” that satisfies formula (4) also satisfies formula (2).
Again, the correlations in (5) can be made defeasible, in order to encompass
different legal interpretations of the provisions. For instance, the fact that an
unauthorized access is a data breach depends on the legal interpretation (which
can vary according to the court or authority). According to Article 4(12) of the
GDPR, which is essentially equivalent to Article 3.1 of ISO 27018, a data breach
is defined as follows:
GDPR, Article 4(12) : ’personal data breach’ means a breach of security lead-
ing to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized
disclosure of, or access to personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise pro-
cessed.
To encompass the different legal interpretations of Article 4(12), we enrich
the last implication in (5) via a predicate stating that the eventuality e is both
an unauthorized access and a data breach under general conditions, but there
might be exceptions where it is an unauthorized access, but not a data breach:
∀e∀z[ ( (access′ e z) ∧ (unauthorized e) ∧ (assumptione e) )
→ (dataBreach e z) ] (6)
Then, in the knowledge base we separately assert that there are several pos-
sible parallel interpretations concerning the assumption. In particular, a court
or authority might decide that:
– the assumption holds as true;
– the assumption does not hold;
– the assumption can hold or not, depending on the conditions.
As an example, we can assume fictitious case law, not pertaining to actual
legal decisions, for the sole purpose of illustrating the methodology. We make up
three decisions as follows:
– Italian Corte di Cassazione, sezione civile, 12530/2012 ;
– Spanish Audiencia provincial de Toledo, n. 57/2016, 2/12/2016 ;
– French Tribunal de Grande Instance d’Avignon, de´cision du 17/04/2016. In
this case, we assume that the specific conditions examined by the Tribunal
consisted in the company Alpha performing a security test on an IT system;
even if unauthorized accesses indeed took place, those cannot be taken as
data breaches in that they were part of the security test.
Table 1 displays the interpretations by the three sources, and the way they
are represented by means of a formula in Reified Input/Output logic. Depending
on the legal interpretation of Article 4(12) that is selected, different inferences
are enabled on the knowledge base.
LegalRuleML provides tags to represent different legal interpretations of the
logical items (see [3]). In our future work, we plan to enrich the knowledge base
in LegalRuleML with legal interpretations, as soon as they come available.
Table 1. Samples of legal interpretations and their translations.
Source Interpretation Formula
Cassazione civile
An unauthorized access is a
data breach.
(assumptione e)
Audiencia de Toledo
A data breach requires not
only an unauthorized access,
but also a breach of security
and a causal connection be-
tween them.
¬(assumptione e)
Tribunal d’Avignon
When a breach of security is
part of security tests, such
as the ones performed by the
company Alpha, leading to
unauthorized access, it is not
considered as a data breach.
∀e(∃z∃et [ ( (access e z) ∧ (unauthorized e) ∧
(partOf e et) ∧ securityTest et) ) ]→
¬(assumptione e) )
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper deals with the complex problematic of complying with abstract legal
rules that usually give little guidance as to the implementation of technical
measures to address the requirements therein. At the same time, it intends to
show the benefits of standards as regards the argument of compliance they can
create in favour on the implementing party once a bridge between the law and
the standards has been created.
This paper advances a logic formalism whereby correlations between provi-
sions of the law and those of a standard can be expressed, and then introduces
a methodology to help build such a bridge in a semi-automated way. The paper
exemplifies the methodology in the context of data protection laws (in particular,
the GDPR) and security standards (ISO 27018), two domains that significantly
overlap given that security is an inherent part of data protection.
By following the illustrated methodology, one can build a machine-processable
knowledge base of logic formulæ that model and store relevant concepts from a
law and a standard together with their possible formal correlations. The knowl-
edge base, which will be collaboratively accessible, will have its records updated
and labelled considering the outcomes of specific auditing processes or decision
of the courts; in time, it will embed substantive correlations, which can serve as
a base for a legal argument for compliance. The logic into which we translate
the correlations is defeasible, allowing them be overridden.
The methodology herein is currently a work in progress and not fully imple-
mented yet: this will require the definition of a detailed taxonomy of concepts
extracted from the law and the security standard. As the work presented herein
is part of a larger research project, its extension is envisioned along various
research directions.
Several technical challenges related to building and updating the knowledge
base are raised. The translations from natural language to logical formulæ must
be uniform for similar text excerpts. To achieve this, we must overcome the
limitations of a manual translation, which would be time-consuming and error-
prone. For this reason, our work must rely on NLP technologies. However, even
at the best of their performances, current NLP algorithms are still unable to au-
tomatically carry out the translation with a reasonable level of accuracy, so we
advocate a semi-automatic translation of the provisions. Similar approaches are
applied to translations in general, where translators are helped by collaborative
tools such as the “SDL Trados Studio”14, which suggests, via text-similarity or
pattern-matching NLP techniques (see [28,37]), how to translate a sentence on
the basis of the translations of similar sentences that the translators have previ-
ously stored in the tool. Inspired by that approach, we will develop an enhanced
text editor to assist the manual translation of provisions into formulæ. For each
provision, the editor will display the translations of similar provisions found via
NLP procedures applied to the provisions already stored in the knowledge base,
in order to induce uniform translations for similar provisions.
In its current structure, the knowledge base does not rely on the connection
between the legal interpretations and the ontology of concepts. Without such a
connection, the knowledge base is not yet mature to to retrieve legal interpre-
tations. To achieve this goal an additional layer will be needed, some formalism
that creates a link between the interpretations and their related concepts. A
potential candidate for this purpose has been identified in the XML language
LegalRuleML [2].
Additionally, we are aware that the knowledge base must be consistent, i.e.,
without contradictions, even after having applied the defeasibility measures. To
check for consistency, we plan to store formulæ using a XML-based data model,
and employ/extend reasoners to monitor the consistency of the knowledge base,
whenever new formulæ are added to it.
Finally, for a solid population of the knowledge base, the methodology would
greatly benefit from a close interaction with legal authorities. We are envisioning
such an interaction in the near future.
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